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The examination focuses on how critical theory has viewed childhood
and employed the image and meaning of childhood in ideological
elaboration. It explores how critical theorists such as Adorno,
Benjamin, Horkheimer, Bloch, and Marcuse contrasted the riches of
childhoodexperience with the povertyof matureadult perception and
with the notion of societal progress. By uniting lost experiential
dimensions of childhood and restoring childhood memory, critical
theoryanticipates a release ofemancipaory reflection and transformed
socialpraxis.
Among the currents of scholarly inquirythere has been growing interest in
the studyof childhood.Childhoodhas recently anracted a great deal of auention.
Studies directed at childhood (Aries 1962; Zelizer 1985; Kuhn 1982) have
investigated the historicaldevelopmentof childhood, theneatmentof childhood
in the past, the social value of childhood, and the literary treatment of
childhood. It is an interesting historical paradox, that childhoodonce unknown,
has now become the most analyzed phase in the developmental cycle of
humans. The significance of childhood in literature, history, and sociology
indicates that it is an archetypicalthemeembedded in social history.
Most historians agree that modernization has increased.adults' concern for
children's well being (de Mause 1974; Shorter 1971). In particular the nineteenth
century saw important changes in Westernanimdes towardchildren. There was
a "surge of sentiment" (Shorter 1977), and a "sacralization" of childhood ,
(Zelizer 1985). - People 'became more likely to view children as priceless,
lovable, vulnerable innocents to be cherishedfor theirown sakes. The purpose
of this'essay'IS '"to-examine this new understanding of childhood as it figures in
critical theory.1
Students of critical theory have examined its history (Jay 1973) and its
main theoretical and empirical concerns (Buck-Morss 1977; Held 1980).
However,conspicuously absent from studiesof critical theory is an examination
of the image, meaning,and status of childhood. The questioninevitably arises,
how is childhood treated in critical theory? "This essay explores how many
critical theorists have contrasted the riches of childhood experience with the
povertyof matureadult perceptionand withsocietal progress.2
71
Mid-American Review ofSociology
TIIE STATUS OF CHILDHOODIN CRITICALTHEORY
One of the greatest costs of progress, critical theorists note, is the
repression of memory-particularly childhood memory. "All reification,"
Theodore Adorno (qtd, in Schroyer 1973: 199) observed, "is forgetting: objects
become thing-like at the moment when they are grasped without being fully
present in all their parts, where something of them is forgotten. It As advanced
industrial society developed the individual was more integrated into and
dependent upon the collectivity and less capable of active self expression.
Adorno is profoundly fascinated by the memory of past experience, particularly
its irresistible lure into the past with its promise of happiness and pleasure, and
its threat to the kind of activity, planning and rational thought encouraged by
modem western civilization. For Adorno the antagonism between society and
memory was resolved by renouncing society. The totality and wholeness that
technological societies denied, Adorno insinuated, existed and could be sought in
childhood, since children had not yet sensed the irreversible and meluctable
impoverishment which led to adulthood and modem civilization.
The hidden and utopian quality of lost childhood memories, their separation
from the rest of life, their inaccessibility, and their incompatibility with
conventional, purposeful, daily, activity, are described lucidly by Walter
Benjamin (1976). Benjamin, himself a collector of children's books, appreciated
the richness of experience to the child. Benjamin's writing on childhood
attempted to capture those moments of wonder, encapsulated in the simple
gesture or the single action of a very young child. Benjamin believed that the
child's graspof his environment and the world around him went far beyond any
discovery made in adult life. "For children," Benjamin wrote:
can accomplish the renewal of existence in a hundred unfailing ways. Among
children, collecting is only one process of renewal; other processes are the
painting of objects, the cutting out of figures; the application of decals-the
whole range of childlike modes of acquisition, from touching things to giving
them names (1973:-102). . .. '~.' ., ~- ,,-'.
To Benjamin, no':-Columbus, noMarco Polo"had'ev~~ seen stranger and more
fascinating and thoroughly absorbing sights than the child who learned taste,
smell, touch, sight and to use their body t their senses, and their mind.
Benjamin idealized the child's capacity for unrepressed emotional and
imaginative experience. In childhood, he found the self to be not only
vigorous, but whole. Benjamin saw children as the incarnation of a miracle that
awoke the sense of the marvelous not only in themselves, but in those who
encountered them.
Benjamin contrasts the riches of childhood experience, the child's great
capacity for impressions and experience with adult experience. In adult
experience formal continuity in time is offset by barrenness in content, by an
incapacity to reproduce anything that resembles a really rich, full, rounded and
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alive experience. In contrast childhood was the period of human life which
was richest in experie~ce. Everythin~ is ne~ to th~ ch~d. Th~ child's grasp of
the ~orld and the envIronmen~ are ~scovenes which I~ expenential scope and
quality, go far beyond any discoveries that are made In adult life. There are
relatively few adults who are fortunale enough to have retained something of the
child's curiosity, capacity for questioning, and for wonder. In Benjamin, the
utopian impulse leads towards an apotheosis of simplicity and a fascination
with the enchanted, the uncanny, and the inexplicable. He found these qualities
in childhood and the fairy tales of childhood. He took fairy tales so literally that
he suggested that they made real fulfillment possible--panicolarly to children.
The wisest thing--60 the fairy tale taught mankind in olden times, and teaches
children to this day- is to meet the forces of the mythical world withcunning
and with high spirits.•.The liberating magic which the fairy tale has at i~
disposal does not bring nature into play in a mythical way, but points to its
complicity with liberated man.A mature man feels this complicity only
occasionally, that is when he is happy, but the child first meets it in fairy tales,
and it makes him happy (1976: 102).
Benjamin was drawn to the sense of enchantment; the engagement with the
"liberating magic" that the child experiences in the fairy tale. He depicted the
child's sense of knowing and understanding as tnmsfonnative. It is these
perceptions of the child he felt which invests everyday experience with
consciousness and meaning.
As early as 1941 Max Horkheimer expressed a serious concern with the
disappearance of childhood and a commitment 10 the redemptive qualities of
childhood. Just as the presence of the child could be a cause for joy, he fell, so
its loss could be a tragedy. "Development has ceased to exist," Horkheimer
wrote:
The child is grown up as soon as he can walk. During the heyday of the family
the father represented the authority 'of.society to thechild, and puberty ~'as the
. inevitable conflict between the two. Today, however, the child stands face to
face with society at once, andtheconflict'is decided even before itarises (1941:.
381).
Horkheimer regarded this as unfortunate. The separation that the adult world
imposed between reality and play, and the demarcation of these activities into
specific contexts was not partof the normal structure of childhood. He believed
children did not view the world like that-at least not until they were taught do
so. Education and learning, while on the one hand furthering the process of
discovery, on the other hand gradually broke it and finally Slopped it
completely. In striking phrase hesitates, "The child, not the father, stan~s for
reality (Horkheimer 1941:381)." He viewed the child's essence as organic and
natural requiring that it not be suffocated by civilization's diseased outpourings
in order to flower. He suggests that the presumable riches of childhood, the
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innocence, thechild'sgreatcapacity for impressions and experiencearecorrupted
as the child is transformed into a grown-up, useful member of society. In the
technological era, a space wherechildren could be at home in the world, where
they could be the subjectand not only the object of history, no longer existed.
In EclipseofReason Horkheimer searched for a liberated future through
regaining the "mimetic impulse of the child." Imitation, Horkheimer argued,
was one of the primary means of learning in early the childhood. The whole
body was an organ of mimetic expression in which such manners as laughing,
crying and speaking were acquired. Eventually, however, civilization
transcended the mimeticimpulse in favor of rational, goal directed behavior:
Conscious adaptation. eventually, domination replace the various forms of
mimesis. The progress of science is the theoretical manifestation of this
change: the formula supplants the image, the calculating machine the ritual
dance(Horkheimer 1977:115).
The schemata of adult memory and social epistemology were not suitable
receptacles for early childhood experiences and were thereforenot fit to preserve
theseexperiencesandenable their recall. The tremendous amount of experience
and the quality of the experience which the child underwent did not find a
proportionate variety of suitable vessels for its preservation in modem
civilization.
Horkheimer,however, impliedthat mimesisneed not be repressed; it could
imitatelife-affmningcharacteristics such as the sense of justice of the father and
the instinctual love of the mother that were superseded by later civilization.
The imitativeimpulse,Horkheimer argued, could be restored throughlanguage:
Languagereflects the longings of the oppressedand the plight of nature;
it releases the mimetic impulse. The transformation of this impulse
into the universal medium of language rather than into destructive
.a~~.i.~~;...~~.a~s t~a.t. potentially nihilistic ...e?et:gies work for .
reconciliaiion...Philosophy helps man to ally his fears by helping
._.~~.I~~g~. fulfill iIB genuine mimetic funcuon.jtsmission of mirroring
. the natural tendencies. Philosophy is at one with art in reflecting
passion through language and thus transferring it to the sphere of
experienceand memory (1977: 115).
Ontogenetically, Horkheimer maintained that this condition is present in the
young child, it is only later tragically overcome by civilization and maturity.
The quality of early childhood experience did not fit into the schemata of
experience fashioned by adultculture with its biases,emphases,and taboos.
For Horkheimerthe child lived in open communication with the world, and
the world in turn invited exploration from the child. Speech for children was
not only an instrument of communication, but the very essence of their jubilant
natur~. Things in the world challenged the child, disclosed themselves to the
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child. Language comprised the mode through which the child realized himself
or herself. It was through language that the child restructured, invented, and
transformed their given reality, for the transforming natureof languageallowed
the child 10 become fully realized as a human being. It was vital, Horkheimer
felt, that the child be permitted to live this life-phase fully, to play and let
things disclose themselves. In this light Habermas's notion of the ideal speech
situation is an elaboration of Horkheimer's notionof childhood.
For Horkheimer language was the child's praxis on the adult world-and
humanity's hope for an alternative to the deterministic laws of technological
society. That is, language could make available and comprehensible the
discrepancy between unschematizedexerience and the categories of civilized
conventional experience. As long as adults can recover through the intellect,
the imagination or the involuntary memory, the mental set of the child, and
appropriate for themselves the schemata within which the child orders the
elements of its experiences, then they could relieve the profound reality of
humanity'scondition, and couldeven retranslate it infO terms comprehensible to
oiheradults.
This apotheosis of childhood is stated in compelling form by Ernst Bloch. A
student of utopian thought, Bloch argued that history was not subject to
deterministic laws that left no place for hwnans and their dreaming. Bloch's
vision of history culminated in nostalgia for the "homeland" seen in
-childhood, but lost to adulthood:
The root of history is working, creating man, man who transforms and
outstrips the conditions of his existence. Lethim achieve self-comprehension
and ground his life in real democracy, without renunciation and estrangement;
then something will arise in the world that all men see in childhood, a place
where no one hasyet lived; homeland (qtd in Wagner 1972: 333).
In the return 10 the lost world of childhood the love and security sacrificed by
the catastrophe of growing up are recaptured. The moreacute the suffering of
the time of separation, the.morekeen the joy of retuminghome again. '. .
Herbert Marcuse also attempted to redefine the social status of the child,
transforming Original Sinimo Original Innocence. Western society, Marcuse
argued, has developed a concept of childhood which contains the dominant
features of what he termed "the performance principle." However, Marcuse
contended that childhood, along with an and phantasy contained the negation of
the "the performance principle." Childlike fantasy, he argueds : retains the
structure and tendencies of the psyche prior to organization by reality. Thus,
childhood linked the deepest layers of the unconscious with the products of
consciousness; preserving the archetypes of liberation, the tabooed images of
.freedom. Childhood preserved the meaning of the subhistorical past; imagesof
liberation are kept alive in literature, art, and in the imagination of children.
Thus, "historical possibility," Marcuse held is present ~n "childish fantasy. II
(Marcuse1962: 145)
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To Marcuse, freedom from social conventions and utilitarian calculation
made the child an emblem of a fuller, more sensuous and imaginative life and a
focal poi~t for a potentially sharp critique of modem society. In Marcuse's
wo~k, Chlldh?OO. rememb~~e b~omes a decisive weapon in the struggle
~g~n.st domlnauo~: Dom!nabOn IS ~a~e possible, he suggests, because the
ability to forget sustains submissiveness and renunciation. Such
forge~ulne~s reproduces the conditions that produce injustice and enslavement.
"A~31~st this surrender to time," he continued, "the restoration of remembrance
to Its rights, as a vehicle.of liberation, is one of the noblest tasks of thought.It
(Marcuse 1962: 212) Childhood represents remembrance, and is viewed as a
vehiclefor the liberation from the restraintsof civilization.3
Conclusion
R.H. Tawney observed that there is no touchstone which reveals the true
character of a social theory more clearly than "its treatment of children."
~a~ey 19~6:268) Tawney expresses the idea that became more or less
In~vltable With the emergence of the modem consciousness of childhood; that
childhood was not only socially important, but ideologically significant; that
the way in whic.h a social theory representsor does not represent childh~ is
w~~y of sc!"lllJny. C~ildhood is ideologically significant in critical theory.
COhea) theorists use childhood as a symbol of liberationand envisionchildhood
as a means of c.hange in. elaborating their ideological position. On the one
~d, an exaltation of chtldh~ ~ints to a critique of technological society.
C~ddhood prese~ts a n~w reality With an order of its OWO. In critical theory
children~ considered mc0!Dplete .~ings who in their very lack of completion,
po~sess gifts that are lost m the finished product and in modern civilization.
Chddho~ also. provides a mechanism for an imaginary escape from
technological society and an ideal for social transformation. Critical theorists
!Jave foundthat the child'~ very autonomy gives it a transfonnativepower which
~::~ces not only the Image we have of children,.but also the image of the
• - .... '.' o. _'.. • • ...." """"'••0. ".'.C"'!-
As a critique of modem society critical theory from Adorno to Habennas
at~~ptsto promote 'conscious-emanc'ipatoCY" .consciousness and' activity,
Critical theory therefore attempts to restore missing parts of the historical
pr~ess to humanity (Sch~yer: 31) and to enable people to Usee through
socially unnecessary authonty and controlsystems." They urge an end to what
Ernest .Schachtel (19~9) has ~a1led "child~ood Amnesia," the forgetting,
r~press~g, and de~alumg of childhoodexpenence. By uniting lost experiential
di~e.nslons of childhood and restoring childhood memory critical theory
anbclp~~ a release of e~ancipatory re~ection and transformed socialpraxis.
. Critical theory POSits an antagonism between society and the status of
childhood and th~ me?1ory of childhood. Critical theorists argue that the
cUltural.ly and soc~a1ly Influenced process of memory organization results in a
r~p~~SSl?n of childhood memories and perceptions. The world of modem
clvihzabon has no place for this type of experience. It cannot permit itself to
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have any use for it, it cannot permit the memory of it, because such memoryor
retrievalof its features would explode the order of civilization.
Childhood provides Adorno, Horkhiemer, Benjamin, Marcuse and other
critical theorists with both a haunting vocabularyof loss that could be exploited
for social criticism of adulthood and modem industrial society. and for
elaborating the features of an idyllic utopian existence. Critical theorists
express a nostalgia for lost innocence-an attraction to characteristics of
childhood in an increasingly corrupt and technological world. The innocent
child is a vision of psychic wholeness in a world where selfhood has become
problematicand sincerityobsolete. Childhood, becauseit is untaintedby social
artifice,embodies the moral innocenceand emotionalspontaneitywhichappears
to be absent in modem society. A common strand of criticism of modem
society is especially clear in the numerous references to the ideal and utopian
features of childhood. These authors juxtapose a child's sincerity with adult
artifice, the child's spontaneous feeling and intense experience with the
utilitariancalculation of adults.
The writers described in these pages find a utopian condition not in the
historical past or the historical future. and not in a particular place or in a
pastoral or technological condition. They find utopia in a special point of
human development- childhood. They encourage the reception and
reproduction of the experiences of childhood as a utopian model of existence.
They find childhood to embodysuch simplicity, innocence,and virtue that they
equate childhood with a utopian paradise. They suggest that social
transformationrests on the ability of adults to recover. through the intellectand
the imagination the mental set of the child and the schemata within which the
child orders the elementsof its experience. In childhood,they hold,peoplecan
stepbeyondexistingarrangements and perceptionsof historyand freelycreatean
alternativehistoryand reality which projects what "can be." They seechildhood
as an organizing experience, which is free from both external and internal
compulsions, is non-instrumental, and transcends the static idea of being and
history, They express-a Iongtng for lost innocence-the . possibility- of
continuing to be childlike and pure in an increasinglycorrupt and dominated
'world.# 'The key to bliss is 'not science and learning, or anytranscendence that"
humanity can store up in itself, but a childlike slate of innocence. They hold
that modem society can only achieve happiness by finding the garden of
childhood once more.
ENDNOTES
The job of constructing this perspective involves piecing together casual
references, tacit assumptions and common themes from the voluminous
literatureof critical theory.
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2 These~rceptions are of coursenot new. At the beginning of the industrial
revolution some authorslookedfor utopianot in social foundation but in a
stageof human developmeot- childhood. The Romantics sawchildhood as
~e "kingdom of heaven.", a secular utopia centered around the nature of
Innoc.e~~ and good beings. . Recoiling from what they saw as the
overcivilized stateof modern existence, theyexaltedthe authentic experience
of chil~~oo~ as an end in ilS~lf. They embraced childhood as an
exemphflcabon. of an altt:matlve to the sterility of positivism and
technology, urging that society affirm and accept childhood with all its
potentialities.
. A .cu.lt ~f child~ood developed in opposition to the features of
~ndustrlahzabon, which saw the child as the embodiment of purity and
Innocence. In the works of Wordsworth, Blake, and Rousseau, children
came to ~e idealized for their special attributes; imagination,
unselfco~sclousness, and a closeness to nature. There was a sense that
mod~rn life had growndry, passionless, and hard, and that the regeneration
o~ch~~ was~ec~. The R?mantic movement captured its senseof
historicaldislocation m the apomeosis of innocence and childhood.
3 As commentators (Held 1980 14; Buck-Morss 1977) have noted critical
theory was a key element in the formation and self uoderstandi~gof the
New~ft andthecounterculture. 1be recovery of childhood is a prominent
~~e 10 the NewLeft and countereultural critiqueof modemtechnological
~If~ ~n the la~.1950's and ~960's. The distinction between "straight" and
hip ~f~n divided generanons, The notionwas perhaps best epitomized in
the -:ippie slogann~t to bUSt anyoneover thirty. The association between
the In~ocence of childhood and the romantic idea of childhood wisdom was
explainedby th~ fact that childrenhad not yet had the opportunity to learn
the ~nns by whichan adult perspective is defined, One of theMovement's
~om.mant .themes entaileda devaluation of adulthood as a bad bargainwith
life In whicho~~ gave up more.~ ~ne .got, ".1 .am neverquite free of the .
force~ atternpbfig to make me grow up, .sign contracts, get an agent, be a
~~~. _,R~y~o~d_)1~ngo_.Qbserved (1970 136-137)'io-his memoirs of the
counterculture.. "I have seen' what' happens to men. It is curious how
helpl~ss, pathetic, and cowardly is what adults call a Real Man...If that is
what IS manhood, no thankyou."
M~y of the fi.gores of the counterculture in the sixties discovered in the
child the harbinger and the shape of a cultural revolution. Norman O.
Brown urges (1972 60) ~umanity."to regain the lost laughterof infancy."
In Slaughter House FIve, subtitled "The Children's Crusade" Kurt~onne~ut's hero BiUy Pilgrimis a childlikefigure who inventshim~lf and
his universe~ a way of coping with the harsh reality of World War II.
Norm~n .MaIler found the saving quality of the hipster-psychopath's
behavior In.th~ retr~t to chil~ood. Mailernoted that whenthepsychopath
acted out his Infantile fantasies, he was trying to go back to the early days
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of his life, which had detennined his characterand course ev~r since, and
remake the decisions that led inexorably to the present. In his (1959 320)
attempt "to try to live the infantile fantasy" ttu: hipster.psych~path tries to
reconnect with his childhood rather than trymg to repress It. Theodore
Roszak who tried to capturethe Zeitgeistof the Movement in his bookThe
MaJcini of a Counterculture, extolled his readers (114) to recapture "our
childishsense of the worldenchanted." Insteadof politicization as a means
to perceptiveself-consciousness and human emancipation heappealed to an
increasing "adolescentation.It
Paul Goodman was among the first ~ng voices to say that the.problems
of growing up in American society derived fromthe natureof SOCle~y rather
than the devianceof youngpeople. "I assume,"G~ (1960 XVI) wro~,
"that the youngreallyneeda morewo~while world10 orderJO growup 10
at all." In Growing UpAbsurd he descnbed~ow the~ys~ thwarted ~d
insulted" the naturalqualities of youth. In his later thinking on the subject
Goodman addedto the traditional romantic viewofchildhood 8S:~ce or
noble savagery the argument that helping to pr~serve wha! I~ best 10 the
natural wildnessof childreninvolves adultsas children; that 1S~ Itcalls upon
adults to reach for residuesof their own childhood from which they may
have only reluctantly "come down" into maturity. Goodman commended
(1977 143) the retrospective creation of adults who have~ught. to.~om:
like unto children, who can "draw upon child powersWI~out mhlblu~n.
As long as the adult could recover the mentalset of the childas appropnate
for themselves, Goodman felt, that they could understand the profound
realityof their condition.
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TO HAVE OR NOT TO HAVE SEX IN CRITICAL
THEORY:' SEXUALITY IN THE EARLY WRITINGS
OF WILHELM REICH AND ERICH FROMM
C. Richard King
University ofIllinois
Mid-American Review of Sociology. 1992, Vol XVI, No.2: 81-91
This paper explores the relationship between society and sexuality,
which is overlookedin the laterphases ofCriticalTheory. The author
begins with a discussion of the role of sexuality in the writings of
Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm. Reich uniformly celebrates and
strategically deploys sexuality to critique Western capitalistic society
while Fromm lacks a clear and consistent utilization of sexuality.
Reich uses Marx in his predominately Freudian framework of sexual
repression in trying to' address the problem of repression and
suppression in Western capitalism. Fromm, on the other hand puts
Freud into his already Marxist approach 10 authority, thefamily, and
ideology. Adorno,Marcuse, and Horkheimer largelyignoredsexuality
in their laterwritings, butinstead usedFreudian concepts in theirtheory
ofthe tuuhoritarian personality.
Despite the much celebrated dismissal of Marxism, associated with the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the continued alteration of
Freudianism, an inexorable conundrum lingers; namely, what does sexuality
have to do with subjectivity and the sociopolitical conditions, familial
organization, and economic relations which produce it? Quite frequently though,
traditional scholars and more innovative Imellectuals, like Mi~hcl Foucault,... ·:_ .... ~=_.
Louis Althusser, and' jacques Lacan, have overlooked, displaced, and even
sublimatedthis question, opting instead to Isolatesexuality, society,class, and
consciousness within discretely·situated and hermetically sealed fields of inquiry.
In contrastwith the current,general avoidance of thepuzzling fit between erotic.
psychic, and socioeconomic domains, throughout the 1920s and 1930s,
numerous thinkers, including OttoFenichel, ReubenOsborn. and Henri de Man,
struggled to ascertain the precise, material relations existent among sexuality,
society, and subjectivity through the integration of Freudianism and Marxism.
But perhaps, the most memorable formulations, conjoining dialectical
materialism and psychoanalysis. werepresented byadvocates of Critical Theory,
especially Erich Fromm, and by the iconoclast, Wilhelm Reich. Since Reich
and Fromm readMarxand Freuddifferently, theyproduced divergent conceptual
schemata for understanding society, subjectivity t and sexuality. In spiteof these
differences, the psychoanalytical sociallheories of Fromm and Reich shared
much in common. The early writingsof Fromm and Reich clearly exemplify
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